Background and statement of the problem: There is sufficient evidence to say that female empowerment affects economic and social outcomes, in particular for girls. There is, however, no unified approach to the measurement of female empowerment. The relative economic position of the two spouses, which in turn may reflect the position of the extended families on both sides, may affect the woman's influence on household decisions. And both economic empowerment and the woman's decision-making power will depend on social norms, which in turn vary between and within societies. Research is still needed to understand these complex relations between economic empowerment, female decision-making power, social norms, and economic and social outcomes. Research methodology and data: The relative land ownership of the paternal and maternal sides of the extended family was used as a measure of female economic empowerment, and the measure was, in turn, used as an instrument for female decision-making power within the family. The latter was measured by DHS-type questions on who make important decisions within the family. In the second stage of the instrumental variable (IV) estimation it was investigated whether the general measure of decision making power affected a particular outcome, children's education. Data was collected in an ethnically diverse area of the eastern plains of Nepal, where 480 women were surveyed. Research findings: The findings indicate that economic empowerment and subjective decision-making power have independent effects on children's education. The relations are quite complex, indicating that one should not automatically use economic empowerment as the ultimate measure of female empowerment. In the present context there is a positive association between female empowerment and children's education for both genders, whereas boys are prioritized if the paternal side of the family is economically weak. Furthermore, there is heterogeneity among social groups with respect to the importance men and women assign different levels of education for children of different genders. The main message is that the mother's relative bargaining power matters in different ways -and through different mechanisms -and depends on the gender of the child, the social group and the level of education. Policy implications: Policies for female empowerment need to be tailor-made to specific societies and social groups. The findings indicate that policies for economic empowerment of women, such as education and entrepreneurship programs, may have to be combined with programs that affect social values and norms if the target is to change intrahousehold decisions.
INTRODUCTION
In addition to being important for women, female empowerment is important to society in general. A recent survey (Doss, 2013) of the role of female empowerment for economic and social development in developing countries concludes that there is sufficient evidence from rigorous studies to conclude that women's bargaining power does affect outcomes. However, in many specific instances, the quantitative evidence cannot rigorously identify causality. As the survey demonstrates, there is a large body of literature that attempts to solve this causality problem by employing randomized controlled experiments and natural experiments or by examining variations in (instrumental) variables that are theoretically likely to affect female empowerment and not the outcomes (other than through female empowerment). The main underlying problem is that any measure of female empowerment may reflect other characteristics, norms or values of the family that are correlated with other factors, such as education, in our case. In the empirical analysis below, we investigate the role of both a subjective (self-reported influence on decisions) and objective (relative economic power) measure of empowerment.
We assume a sequential nature regarding decisions about education. The relative economic power of the natal families determines a woman's decision-making power in her own family; moreover, when her preferences differ from those of her husband, the level of education of her children will be affected. With this structure, one can either use instrumental variable (IV) regression and estimate both stages of the sequence (assuming that economic empowerment affects education only through decision-making power) or one can estimate the (reduced form) effect of relative economic power on education.
The strategy of sidestepping the intermediate direct measure of female empowerment -and thus studying empowerment indirectly -is the most common approach. The survey by Doss discusses some prominent examples of this approach from the literature. Two papers (Rangel, 2006; Deininger et al., 2010) study the effect of a change in marriage and inheritance law on the education of girls. Another paper (Qian, 2008) studies exogenous changes in sex-specific agricultural incomes and the effects on survival rates and educational attainment of children. Other studies (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003) find that the pre-marriage assets of women increase expenditures for education and (Fafchamps, Kebede and Quisumbing, 2009 ) affect children's nutrition and education.
Few papers attempt to measure female empowerment directly, and those that do typically use questions that are similar to the standard set of questions in the Demographic and Health surveys (DHS) with respect to who in the household decides on certain issues, such as household purchases or the woman's visits to relatives (which is the measure we use). An aggregate measure might be used, such as a simple average (Li and Wu, 2011) or a principal component analysis (Chakraborty and De, 2011) , because many decisions are considered. Any variable that might affect the measure of female empowerment may also influence the ultimate outcome. Li and Wu manage this problem by reporting both the effect of the exogenous variable (in their case, the gender of the first-born) on the measure of female empowerment and on the dependent variable (they have a set of health and expenditure outcomes). Then, they estimate the IV regression (in which female empowerment is the endogenous variable) as a robustness check (and realize that the instrument may affect outcomes through other mechanisms than female empowerment).
We follow the strategy of Li and Wu and report both the reduced form and the two stages of the IV. However, we use a different instrument -and we do not use an aggregate empowerment index -because we prefer to identify one particular variable that is likely to measure empowerment and not education 1 . We are not the first to use assets as the presumably exogenous variable. One prior study (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003) measures assets through the respondents' recall of "the assets they owned before their wedding", whereas another study (Anderson and Eswaran, 2009 ) uses unearned assets that were "acquired through inheritance or as a transfer at the time of marriage". Anderson and Eswaran (2009) do not examine ultimate outcomes but instead focus on the separate roles of unearned assets (and implicitly unearned incomes) and earned incomes (where they use exogenous agricultural and health shocks as instruments of earned incomes) in determining female empowerment (measured by their influence on household purchases). Another related study from Nepal is Allendorf (2007) in which women's ownership of land (measured indirectly) is used as a determinant of female empowerment (using the DHS measures) as well as the ultimate outcome (child health).
We use a slightly different instrument than used in the studies discussed above. In a survey whose focus was on son-preference, birth-order, number of children and the possible effects on different economic outcomes 2 , we added a question regarding present ownership of land for all family members and the land ownership of the natal families of the two spouses. In an ideal world, we would like to have the entire history of land ownership, but we know that land is normally transferred in the family, so that the current aggregate family land will largely reflect the same landholdings from when the children were school age. Furthermore, we believe that if the woman's natal family is wealthier than her husband's natal family, she will have more say in her own family. We believe there are two main mechanisms.
First, if a woman's natal family is wealthy, she can move back home (this outcome is not uncommon in Nepal), even without the couple divorcing. Second, her husband may depend on her father or brothers for his income. Either they can pool resources (for example, by collaborating on the production and marketing of agricultural products) or he can obtain financial help directly or by securing collateral for loans. In the next section, we present the underlying model, followed by sections on the estimation and data, then the findings and conclusions.
MODEL
The model that motivates the empirical analysis is a bargaining model in which the household maximizes the utility,
, where  measures the wife's decision-making power over the allocation of the household income to consumption c and to the children's education e. We assume that the wife has a stronger preference for education (at any c-e pair near the optimal solution, she is at the margin and willing to substitute more c for e)
3
. The income y is a function of their landholdings, y(k), and will optimally be fully spent on c and e. With the normal concavity assumptions on the u-and y-functions, we obtain an interior solution in which education will optimally increase land (the budget line shifts outwards) and female empowerment (the optimal c-e pair shifts along the budget-line),
Our direct measure of subjective decision-making power may reflect correlated factors that also affect children's education (Basu, 2006) . These factors include the education and employment of both spouses and many unobservable characteristics, including preferences for education. It is thus essential to find an instrument that may affect female empowerment but not children's education. If we presume that the husband is optimizing as described above, then the weight  he puts on his wife's preferences regarding c and e will likely depend not on her characteristics alone; instead, her parents (and brothers in our data) will likely react if her preferences are not considered. This weight will also likely depend on whether the husband will consider this expected reaction. His expected reaction, in turn, will depend on the relative economic power of her family in the local community compared with his family. Therefore,  becomes a function of the relative economic power of the two families, which we measure by their landholdings,
where an increase in maternal side land f k will strengthen female empowerment, whereas an increase in paternal side land will decrease female empowerment. Inserting the foregoing in (1), we obtain the reduced form:
We estimate the reduced form in (3) as well as (1) and (2) in a two-stage IV estimation. In this model, the zero hypothesis of no role of female empowerment will be that neither f k nor m k affects children's education. Note that the model assumes that f k and m k have no direct effect on education; in other words, the grandparents do not invest in their children's education. We observe below that this presumption may not apply and that there may in fact be an additional income effect. If there is such an effect, then the interpretation of the reduced form model in (3) will change. To model this possibility, we allow for a more general income function, y (k, f k , m k ), where the core household income depends not only on land ownership but also on the land ownership of the extended families (because the grandparents may help economically and even tie the extra income to the children's education). In this case, (1) 
. If we linearize this equation and (2), we obtain the reduced form equation,
which we may write as,    . In other words, the positive side income effect is so much greater than the maternal side income effect that it cancels out the female empowerment effect. This is a special case in which the husband does not prioritize the children's education, although his parents indirectly do. However, we only have to consider this interpretation only if the zero hypothesis is not rejected.
ESTIMATION
The decision to go to school and the decision regarding the number of years of schooling may in principle be influenced by different factors, and we would ideally model these decisions as a two-stage process. However, we believe that the same variables affect both decisions; therefore, we estimate two separate linear equations. In one regression, the variable e takes the value of 0 when people are illiterate and the value of 1 when they have completed grade one or more or report that they are literate. In the second regression, the value of 1 is replaced by the number of years of schooling.
Considering the explanatory variables, we have focused thus far on land, and there seems to be major discontinuities at zero for all three variables. This is not surprising. Land is a major asset in Nepal, and having no land results in weak bargaining positions in most social and economic interactions, even compared with households with only a small plot of land. With some land, you may be able to collateralize loans, and if you can produce some of your own food, you will improve your bargaining position in the labor market (because you can refuse inferior jobs or wages). These discontinuities are modeled by adding a dummy for landlessness for each of the three types of owners.
To keep the analysis of interaction effects relatively simple (without changing the main message), we use only these dummy variables for the extended family landholdings (and their interaction with the gender of the child). For own land, we also include the amount of land. With empowerment measured by landlessness, we only have to test whether maternal side landlessness has a different parameter than paternal side landlessness. However, we interact the two conditions because we expect education to be even lower if both sides are landless. The best test for female empowerment is to compare the two cases in which either only the maternal side or only the paternal side is landless. We made sure to inquire regarding the landholdings of the full extended family, husband, wife, children, husband's and wife's brothers, mother and father -a total of nine different categories. Because land markets are not well developed in the region, the most common change in land ownership divides it among the family. This situation has escalated recently because of expectations of binding land ceilings, particularly because of the armed Maoist insurgency and their rise to power on the national stage. Thus, we expect the three first categories to add up to the land-holdings at the time the children received their education. Therefore, the k in equation (3) is the sum of the land of the husband, wife and their children. Similar summations are conducted for the maternal and paternal side extended families. Assuming that all transfers have been made within the family (at least during recent years), we thus implicitly have a measure of family land at the time that decisions were made concerning the children's education.
DATA
The survey was conducted in an ethnically diverse district (Morang) in the eastern tarai (plains) of Nepal. Of the 125 caste and ethnic groups recorded in the national census of 2011, 110 different groups reside in Morang. The study area is northeast of the city of Biratnagar, which is located on the border of India (Bihar). Using population to determine the likelihood of being chosen, five villages (Village Development Committees, or VDCs) were randomly selected among 12 VDCs that constitute the study area. In the second stage, four wards from each VDC were randomly selected. The wards constitute the primary sampling units (PSUs). All the estimates provided below will have clustered standard errors at the ward level, and we use ward fixed effects in most regressions. Then, 24 women aged 40-59 years were randomly selected from each PSU, which resulted in 480 interviews in 20 PSUs. The age range was selected to ensure that most of the women had completed their fertility cycle.
The questionnaire -and particularly the section on female empowerment -was mostly based on the Nepal demographic and health survey (DHS) because it is a welltested and standardized questionnaire. Some topics of interest, particularly information regarding the land ownership of the extended family on the paternal and maternal side, were added to the questionnaire, and the questionnaire was pretested. Three enumerators (two females), who were all involved in the recent DHS, were deployed for the field survey. The survey was implemented from mid-November 2011 to mid-January 2012. Rigorous field supervision was conducted by the authors as well as a supervisor from the survey agency (Kathmandu-based New Era). Double entry was used to ensure the quality of data.
The focus of the study was the number of children, children's education and fertility decisions. Accordingly, the main targets of the survey were women and children. Of the 480 women, 462 had living children. We focus on children who are no longer in school and in some type of work; there were a total of 1,062 children in our sample who were born to 386 women (with 337 of these women living with their husband, and the rest widows). By children, we do not mean that they are in childhood; instead, they are the children of the women sampled for the survey and could be of any age. Table 1 presents the basic characteristics of the sample and the variables that will be included in the regression analysis. The first set of variables measures the social identity of the respondents. For generations, there has been migration to the plains from the hills of Nepal and from India. The migrants from India, as well as the indigenous population of the tarai, will constitute the 'tarai origin' subsample below. The tarai origin population accounts for 81 percent of the sample, with the remaining 19 percent being of hill origin. We note that the small hill origin sample behaves differently regarding education, and they will be analyzed separately and even dropped from the final regression analysis (the sample is too small for a full separate analysis including fixed effects and clustering at the ward level). Altogether, there are 35 different castes and ethnic groups belonging to either the hill or the tarai category. Of these, the Tharu, a tarai ethnic group, constitutes approximately 34 percent of the sample, followed by the Bantar (14%), a tarai Dalit group. In the hill origin category, Chhetri constitutes 5.9 percent and is the only hill origin group with more than five percent of the sample. Note that the 'hill' sub-sample also live in our tarai (plains) study area. Considering the dependent variable, education is measured by literacy and years of schooling. Table 1 shows that 85 percent of the sample is literate, whereas the average number of years of schooling is 6.2 years, which means that the average person has completed the primary level of education, which is up to grade five. Because we have a sample of 'children' who have completed schooling, we find that the average age is as high as 27 years, with a span of 10 to 50 years. The mothers are on average 52 years old in a range from 38 to 69. The gender composition is normal because 51 percent of the sample is male.
Three categories of land are measured, namely, landholding of the extended family on the maternal side, landholding of the extended family on the paternal side, and own landholding. The extended family includes fathers, mothers, and brothers. 'Own land' refers to the land owned by the respondent (female) or by her husband or children. Table 1 shows that 53 percent of the sample live in landless households. The average landholding (including the zeroes) is 12.2 kattha (0.41 hectare). The proportion of landlessness among the women's extended family (61%) appears higher than for her own family. In addition, the proportion of landless households among their husbands' extended families (67%) is higher than for their own families. There are, however, some large farms on the maternal side; therefore, the average landholding is higher for the maternal side (20.2 kattha or 0.68 hectare), compared with the two other categories. Thus, the maternal side landholding is better off on average than the mother's own family and at least as well off as her husband's family. This fact indicates that women from families with less land marry out of our study area.
Female empowerment is measured by DHS type questions, and we use the question regarding who decides about visits to the woman's relatives. The question has three possible answers, i.e., the female decides alone, the husband alone decides, or they jointly decide on visits to her relatives (the questionnaire is available upon request). These questions were naturally asked only of women who are currently married, which led to a smaller sample size (915 children) for this measure. Note that we keep all women in the sample to avoid a potential selection problem when feasible (in a regression analysis in which we do not control for this measure of subjective decision-making power).
We find that an overwhelming majority of the sample have mothers who reported that they jointly decide on her visits to relatives (88%). Only five percent of the females decide by themselves to visit relatives, which is lower than the percentage in which the husband decides on the female visiting relatives. The low share of 'empowered' women and 'powerful' men may explain why the IV-regression below has limited explanatory power and why we must focus, in the end, on the reduced form estimates in which the landholdings of the extended families are the essential determinants of children's education.
RESULTS

Descriptive statistics
We first investigate the relation between female empowerment and education. As discussed above, we measure female empowerment in terms of the decision-making power of women with respect to visiting her relatives. This measure seems to be associated with the literacy level of her children. We must separate people of hill and tarai origin because essentially all hill origin children are literate, so there is no variation, as shown in the lower part of Table 2 . For the tarai origin sample, we first find that boys receive more education than girls (the apparent lower level of literacy of boys in the 'male-only-decides' group is not a significant difference). With respect to the role of female empowerment, we find that if she makes the decision to visit relatives by herself, then this empowered woman also seems to be able to affect the literacy level of her own children (the numbers in the first column are the highest, and they are significantly higher than the larger control group in the last column). Regarding the years of schooling in Table 3 , we again find that boys receive more education than girls. The higher level for girls in the tarai 'male-only-decides' group is again not significant, but the level is lower for boys in this group compared with the groups in which the mother has some say. Again, there is evidence of female decisionmaking power. We apply regression analysis to investigate whether the measures of female empowerment are significant when we control for other variables (ward (village), ethnicity, gender and the age of the children 4 ). Although the sample is small, the descriptive statistics indicate that the groups of hill-ethnic identity behave differently than the tarai origin groups. In an ideal world, we would like to run separate regression analyses for the two groups. However, because only the tarai sample is large enough, we will discuss the behavior of the hill-ethnic groups based on descriptive statistics only.
We expect the relative landholdings of the extended families of the two spouses to be a useful instrument, i.e., a variable that potentially affects female bargaining power, and education only through the bargaining power. Before we proceed to the regression analysis, we show the correlation between relative landholdings and female bargaining power and the correlation between the variable and education because a good instrument should also affect the dependent variable in the reduced form. Table 4 indicates that there is no strong relation between relative landholdings and female bargaining power, which suggests that the instrument is weak. The main significant finding is that in families in which both extended families are landless, there is a tendency for the husband to decide his wife's visits to relatives. However, this tendency is more likely to reflect that both sides are equally poor, not an underlying empowerment of the paternal side.
TABLE 4. FEMALE EMPOWERMENT AND LAND OF EXTENDED FAMILY (TARAI ORIGIN)
Who decides on female visits to her relatives Tables 5 and 6 show the correlation between relative landholdings and education. As discussed earlier, the focus is the larger tarai sub-sample. Female children receive less education than male children if both the male and maternal sides are landless or only the paternal side is landless. We shall observe later (but shown here with a reference to Table 8 ) that this finding is confirmed by the regression analysis in which we control for more variables. This result indicates that paternal side landlessness is the essential variable. An economically powerless paternal side of the extended family will nonetheless attempt to prioritize education for male children. If land on the maternal side was the explanation, then we should expect to find a difference in the two last columns.
With respect to the years of schooling in Table 6 , there seems to be no similar effect of relative economic power. There are only small differences between the second and third columns. In general, all girls receive less education, and if both sides of the extended family are poor, then all children receive less education. Therefore, for the tarai sample, the relative economic power seems to matter for literacy but not for years of schooling. Column (2) Table 8 22.6*** 3.2 13.7*** 6.8
Column (3) Column (2) Table 9 1.8*** 1.7** 2.5*** 1.5* Column (3) Significantly different from zero (or from reference category) at the ***1%, **5%, and *10% levels.
For the hill sample, there is no significant difference between gender, but in the male group we find a lower level of education if the paternal side is landless (the first and third columns). Thus, although relative economic power seems to matter for literacy among the tarai groups, it matters for years of schooling among hill origin males (but in this group, a powerless paternal side is associated with less education for boys).
IV-regressions
The descriptive statistics suggest that the instrument works in the reduced form but not through our measure of female empowerment. We run the IV regression to check whether the instrument has some merit. We construct dummy variables for two of the outcomes on the empowerment variable, i.e., female only decides and male only decides. Then, we interact these variables with the gender of the child, which results in four endogenous variables. As instruments, we use dummy variables for three of the four categories of the extended family landlessness variable, which are again interacted with the gender of the child; therefore, we have six instruments. The first-stage regressions are reported in the first four columns of Table 7 . The final IV regression is presented in the fifth column, and the corresponding ordinary least square regression is located in the final column (the same regression is also presented in the last column of Table 8 ). We control for ward fixed effects in all columns, and we cluster the standard errors at the ward level.
As we can observe, the F-statistics and the Hansen-J-statistics are all low, and the instruments are rarely significant. When we compare the IV estimates in the secondto-last column with the non-IV regression in the last column, we note that there are substantial differences in the coefficients. Again, this outcome reflects the problems with the IV. The predicted values of the endogenous female empowerment variables take very small values (because very few families have the value of one in the underlying variable).
The small values seem to explain the unrealistically large coefficients for the predicted endogenous variables (we should expect these to be in the range between zero and one as they are in the non-IV regression). In sum, we conclude that the instruments are weak. More importantly, we note below in column (4) of tables 8 and 9 that the instruments (in addition to the presumably endogenous female empowerment variables) are likely to directly affect education. Adding to this evidence, we also find (in tables 8 and 9) that the coefficients are, for the most part, in the same range whether we include either both sets of variables (female empowerment and extended family land) or only one set. This result indicates that the endogeneity problem concerning female empowerment is not serious and that we can thus interpret the two sets of variables independently. 
Female empowerment and relative economic power as separate explanatory variables
We now consider the main findings, where both measures of relative empowerment may affect children's education. Column 1 of Table 8 is a reproduction of the descriptive statistics in Table 2 for the tarai origin sample. For example, the female-male difference in literacy rates for households in which both the paternal and the maternal side is landless equals 22.2 in Table 2 , which is the same as the sum of the parameters 0.054+0.081-0.025+0.112=0.222 from column 1 of Table 8 . The sum of these parameters is also significantly different from zero. Similar calculations can be performed for the other differences in Table 2 . In general, the significance levels and differences are the same when we add the control variables in Table 8 , although there is some minor variation. In particular, the difference between male and female children in families with paternal side landlessness of the extended family is now significant at the 1% level in columns 2 and 3, with the difference being 13.7 when we control for ward fixed-effects; this difference is 14.8 when we also control for age and the ethnic background of the household. We have calculated the differences between female and male children with significance levels and based on the parameters in columns 2 and 3 in tables 8 and 9, and we report these calculations on separate lines in Table 2 and 3. Considering the main findings beginning with Table 8 , we first note that the results in column 4 are not very different from columns 3 and 5. This similarity indicates that both our subjective and objective (relative economic power) measures of female empowerment affect education. Regarding the subjective measure, we find that for female children, there appears to be a U-formed relation between empowerment and literacy. Girls are less likely to be literate if the mother and father make joint household decisions. For households without joint decisions, the effect of female empowerment is the strongest. For male children, female empowerment again correlates with literacy, whereas male power leads to less education. These findings correspond to the descriptive statistics in Table 2 , although they were not significant there. For both genders, we thus find that female empowerment appears to improve the chances of being literate. From Table 5 , we recall that if the paternal side is landless, then female children are less likely to be literate than male children. This finding holds when we add control variables. Therefore, an economically powerless paternal side of the extended family prioritizes male education. Considering the control variables, we find (as expected) that 'children' of older age (at the time of survey) are less likely to be literate. For years of schooling, we find that male power implies less education but only for boys, which we also observe in the descriptive statistics in Table 3 and is the same finding we had for literacy. Again, this finding does not correspond with the effect of economic power; therefore, there may be some unobservable characteristics that the subjective measurement includes that explains this difference.
The effects of the objective measure are again calculated and reported above in Table 6 , where we recall that the main finding is that girls receive less education independent of the economic strength of the extended families. In terms of the regression analysis in Table 9 , this result means that only the male child dummy on the first line is significant, whereas most permutations of the landholdings of the extended families are not. The only relevant finding is that if both extended families are landless, then all children receive less education. We make similar findings with respect to the control variables in Table 9 . If the core family is landless, then the children receive less education. In addition, the more land the core family owns, the higher educational level the children attain 5 . As with literacy, we also find that older 'children' have less education. Only with respect to years of schooling, we find that Dalit children receive less education.
CONCLUSIONS
We find a positive association between female empowerment and children's literacy levels. For years of schooling, we find that boys receive less education in families in which the father is the sole decision maker. This result, in particular, can be explained by underlying factors that may affect boys' education and the father's power over the household. When we attempt to adjust for unobservable variation in an instrumental variables regression, we find that our instrument, the relative economic power of the extended families, is weak. We discover that female empowerment and the economic power measures have separate and independent effects on children's education. The estimates do not change substantially if we add or exclude one set of measures.
Thus, in the search for an instrument for female empowerment we found that the deeper determinants of female bargaining power (the economic resources of the natal families) also affect household decisions on children's education. There is also an indication (although potentially reflecting other un-observable components, such as liberal norms) that female empowerment has an independent effect beyond the female natal family's economic resources.
For relative economic power, we find that if the paternal side of the extended family is poor, then they nonetheless attempt to educate the boys. This finding is limited to the tarai origin subsample because essentially all children in the hill origin sample are literate. For the hill origin sample, we find some support for the opposite finding; in other words, boys receive fewer years of schooling if the paternal side of the extended family is landless. Therefore, in the same villages, there seems to be community-specific variation in preferences.
With respect to methodology, we have discovered complex interactions between the landholdings of the extended family and the level of children's' education. In addition, these interactions vary among social groups and with the gender of the child. Our strategy of conducting a separate analysis for different social groups (hill origin compared with tarai ethnic identity), a separate analysis for literacy and years of schooling -in addition to interacting both the subjective and objective female empowerment measures with the gender of the child -seems to be useful in disentangling these complexities.
Our findings add to the literature that attempts to disentangle the interactions among different measures of female empowerment. We know that strong women have other priorities than their husbands, and for the less empowered, we know that programs for female empowerment may improve outcomes, particularly for their female children (Doss, 2013) . The literature indicates, however, that identifying the causal effects is not straightforward. We find heterogeneity between social groups in the importance men and women accord different levels of education for the different genders of children. This result indicates that any evaluation of programs that attempt to empower women should attempt to map a set of possible effects that may vary with gender, social group and measures of outcomes.
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